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Scholarship on George H.W. Bush tends to regard his career with the State Department in 
the context of traditional presidential biography. His tenure as Ambassador to the United 
Nations thus becomes a line-item on a presidential resume with little significance beyond 
its usefulness as a political credential. This paper situates Bush’s voice as it appears in his 
personal diary into one of the widescreen events of Sino-American rapprochement, the 
conclusion in 1971 of the long-simmering conflict over Chinese representation at the U.N. 
(CHIREP) between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the American-backed 
Republic of China (ROC). As chief of the U.S. Mission to the U.N. (USUN) in 1971 the 
fight over CHIREP represents George H.W. Bush’s “first bleeding,” a baptism into both 
the ecology of international diplomacy and a sustained, imbricate relationship with the 







Keywords: George H.W. Bush; CHIREP; Sino-American Rapprochement; United Nations; 





On October 29, 1971 the Ambassador to the United Nations George H.W. Bush 
waited in the green room of The Dick Cavett Show at New York’s Elysée Theater on 
West 58th Street. Earlier in the week a critical U.N. vote had fallen against the United 
States, and President Richard Nixon’s press secretary Ron Ziegler had bungled delivery of 
the Nixon party line on the event. Certainly Ambassador Bush was disgusted by the 
“gladiatorial ugliness” and hisses directed at the U.S. delegation, but Ziegler’s unfortunate 
phrasing and bluster just created complications.1 Shaping the posture of the United States 
at the U.N. required a delicate touch.2 Now Nixon had Bush in front of the cameras of 
television talk-shows like Firing Line, Issues and Answers, and Dick Cavett in an effort to 
better spin the loss.3 
“As everybody knows by now,” the show’s host began, “last Monday late into the 
night the United States lost the fight to keep nationalist China in the United Nations, and 
the Albanian resolution to admit communist China to the U.N. was passed, and Taiwan 
was sort of . . . booted out.”4 Cavett looked into the camera and continued, “It was a 
moment of what’s been described as quote ‘a shocking demonstration of undisguised glee 
 
1 United Nations Diary, 31 October 1971, folder 14, OA/ID 25863, United Nations Files, George Bush 
Collection, George Bush Presidential Library. Hereafter abbreviated Bush U.N. Diary. 
2 Ibid. 
3 “This weekend I have done three television shows . . . the president wants my interpretive backup.” Ibid. 
4 The Dick Cavett Show, “George Bush Reacts to Taiwan Being Kicked Out of the United Nations,” 
YouTube Video, 8:04, October 29, 1971, accessed October 15, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=PXr7lRzBE4o. Cavett himself understood his television program’s historical significance and in 2017 
donated two thousand hours of his programming to the Library of Congress. See “Library Acquires 




and personal animosity toward the United States’ . . . the cheering and so on that went 
on.”5 The host closed with a wry introduction while backstage Bush jammed his left-hand 
into his pocket anxiously. “My next guest is the American Ambassador to the United 
Nations . . . the man responsible for keeping them in. Will you welcome please, a 
gentleman who may have overcome his depression by now—or not I don’t know! Will 
you welcome please Ambassador George Bush!”6  
Polite applause greeted the gangly Bush as he strode in from the wings wearing 
defeat. His head hung low, and he steadied himself on the railing as he stepped to the 
stage. They shook hands. Dick Cavett casually opened his jacket and sat down. Bush left 
his suitcoat buttoned shut which bulged awkwardly as he drew into himself, hands buried 
in his lap. The two men met eyes, the studio audience stilled, and Cavett’s opening quip 
caught Bush flat-footed. “Do you feel like a loser?”7 
Blue-blooded George H.W. Bush spent the first forty-six years of his life aglow 
with an elite and quintessentially American greatness. His privileged upbringing 
guaranteed him a life of certain significance, access to power, and eased mobility. At 
eighteen he enlisted in the United States Navy and flew fifty-eight missions in a fabled 
TBM Avenger in the Pacific, eventually pulled from the sky by Japanese anti-aircraft fire 
off Chichi Jima. Safely back home, Bush finished schooling at Yale and married his high 
school sweetheart Barbara Pierce whom he’d doted on in letters while deployed. His 
 
5 The Dick Cavett Show, “George Bush Reacts to Taiwan Being Kicked Out of the United Nations,” 
YouTube Video, 8:04, October 29, 1971, accessed October 15, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=PXr7lRzBE4o. 
6 “Well . . . I don’t feel like a loser,” Bush replied. Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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family’s wealth provided the financial stake for a timely entry into an oil business just 
entering a new phase of wild post-war growth in the 1950s. How strange then for Bush to 
find himself on a losing streak. 
A failed bid in 1970 to represent Texas in the U.S. Senate stung. Its consolation 
prize was an appointment in 1971 to the United Nations, work for the State Department 
which excited the middle-aged public servant and promised valuable diplomatic 
experience on an international stage. But bureaucratic dysfunctions and a long-simmering 
fight with communist China at the U.N. had a weary Bush shuttling between the White 
House and the State Department, Washington D.C. and New York City, and from 
embassy to office in a doomed crusade to bend the U.N. to the will of the United States. 
So how does George H.W. Bush’s career at the U.N. play out in the diplomatic 
trenches? A teleological view might suggest the foreign policy credentials Bush first gained 
at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. (USUN) helped place him on the 1980 Ronald Reagan 
presidential ticket.8 Bush’s time at the United Nations did move on international tensions 
over Chinese representation (CHIREP) as the U.N.’s General Assembly swelled in the long 
moment of decolonization’s first intense wave.9 These new nations tilted the voting 
 
8 Testifying to Bush’s total inexperience with international diplomacy at the time of his appointment to the 
USUN, the quote “George, what the fuck do you know about foreign affairs?” from Yale classmate and 
Thomas “Lud” Ashley appears across the constellation of Bush biographies. Bush and Lud Ashley both 
joined the Yale secret society “Skull and Bones” in 1948. Ashley later represented Ohio in Congress for 26 
years, eventually serving on the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library Foundation board. 
9 A basic understanding of the “fundamental coherence of this historical moment” of decolonization can be 
had in Jan C. Jansen, Jürgen Osterhammel, and Jeremiah Riemer’s chapter “Paths to Sovereignty” in 
Decolonization, A Short History (Princeton University Press, 2017), 71–118. Also see Angela Torelli, “The 
Costs of Realism: The Nixon Administration, the People’s Republic of China, and the United Nations,” 
The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 19, no. 2 (2012): 157–82. The local end of the circuit 
between new sovereign nations and the institution of the U.N. is centered in Christopher O’Sullivan’s “The 
United Nations, Decolonization, and Self-Determination in Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-1994,” 
Journal of Third World Studies 22, no. 2 (2005): 103–20. 
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balance away from the United States, the outcome determined before he even arrived. 
However the map drawn by such broad historical strokes does not necessarily represent 
the territory. For George Bush specifically, such geopolitical stresses played out along a 
terrain of institutional discord more than eventful diplomacy. Bush’s own account of 
CHIREP as included in his personal diary located at the George Bush Presidential Library 
and Museum supports this interpretation. 
In pursuit of historical sense, I draw on the analytical toolkit of political science as 
well as the culturally-minded strategies of the New Diplomatic History to examine Bush’s 
personal record of the CHIREP fight as expressed in his habitual diaristic impulse and 
correspondence. In the paper’s first section I explore George Bush’s frustration as he 
struggled to overcome the bureaucracy of state, institutional short-circuits, and the 
unanticipated social responsibilities of his new round-the-clock job at the U.N. In its 
second I consider the CHIREP event as it relates to Bush. I conclude by looking forward 
at what the legacy of CHIREP might mean for Bush’s future China-imaginary. 
Throughout I situate the voice of George H.W. Bush into 1970s Sino-American 
rapprochement and argue that the CHIREP fight at the U.N. represents his “first 
bleeding,” a baptism into both the ecology of international diplomacy and a sustained, 




This paper does not strictly trace the patterns of a “presidential history” as it takes 
for its topic only a single event which occurred during George H.W. Bush’s pre-White 
House career. However, I think it’s useful to consider the ways in which Bush scholarship 
and presidential history have been touched by an advantageous flow across once-fortified 
disciplinary boundaries. Brian Balogh describes a slow decline in scholarly attention paid 
to the American Presidency, a casualty of the overdue tilt in the 1970s toward writing 
“history from below.”10 Political historians in the 1980s focused on the “durable 
bureaucratic structures” of modern government while their colleagues in the social 
sciences focused more strictly analytical lenses on the agency of the state.11 Meanwhile, 
appraisals of those such as Bush who wielded an undeniable hierarchical power were “left 
to political scientists, the public intellectuals labeled “presidential historians” by the 
media, and . . . legal scholars.”12 
America’s current moment of inflexibility and acute inequality demands historians 
stare unblinking at the narratives which sustain its political pantheon.13 To this purpose I 
amplify Bruce Schulman’s suggestion that historians analyzing the lives of presidents 
 
10 Brian Balogh, “Introduction: Confessions of a Presidential Assassin,” in Recapturing the Oval Office: 
New Historical Approaches to the American Presidency, ed. Brian Balogh and Bruce J. Schulman, 
(Cornell University Press, 2015), 1–8. 
11 Ibid., 2. 
12 Ibid., 6. 
13 I look here to recent cultural trends in the reassessment of organizational structure at museums, galleries, 
public sites of memory, et cetera. American national memory’s constructive literature requires as much 
scrutiny as the more tangible architectonics which give it place. 
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ought to breach the top-down and bottom-up divide.14 I believe that to trade heroic 
presidential exceptionalism for microhistories which speak to “broader issues affecting 
the culture as a whole,” to reseat figures like Bush into the ecologies which conferred their 
power, can nourish vital sense-making.15 
Bush presidential biography begins in 1992 with Richard Ben Cramer’s gonzo 
accounting of the 1988 presidential race What It Takes: The Way to the White House, 
though it lacks both scholarly properness and source disclosure.16 In 1997 the George 
Bush Presidential Library and Museum opened in College Station, Texas and a more 
academic Bush biography arrived from former social studies teacher Herbert S. Parmet 
which sticks closely to the “who, what, when, and where” of narration with little abstract 
analysis.17 Tim Naftali's institutionally-minded entry into The American Presidents Series 
portrayed Bush in 2007 as the good political soldier, an “understudy” who did not shy 
 
14 Bruce J. Schulman, “Conclusion: The Perils and Prospects of Presidential History,” in Recapturing the 
Oval Office New Historical Approaches to the American Presidency, edited by Bruce J. Schulman and 
Brian Balogh, (Cornell University Press, 2015), 250–258. 
15 For this paper I found much comfort in Lepore’s embrace of the haze which surrounds microhistories 
whose “arguments, slippery as eels, are difficult to fish out of the oceans of story,” also taken from the 
article “Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on Microhistory and Biography,” The Journal of 
American History 88, no. 1 (2001): 129–144. See also Carlo Ginsburg “Microhistory: Two or Three 
Things That I Know About It”, translated by John and Anne C. Tedeschi, Critical Inquiry 20, no. 1 
(2003): 10–35; Sigurður Gylfi Magnússon, “Social History as ‘Sites of Memory’? The Institutionalization 
of History: Microhistory and the Grand Narrative,” Journal of Social History 39, no. 3 (2006): 891–913; 
Sigurður Gylfi Magnússon and István M. Szijártó, What Is Microhistory?: Theory and Practice, (London ; 
New York: Routledge, 2013); David A. Bell “Total History and Microhistory: The French and Italian 
Paradigms,” in A Companion to Western Historical Thought, edited by Lloyd Kramer and Sarah Maza 
(Oxford: Backwell, 2002), 262–76; Giovanni Levi, “On Microhistory” in New Perspectives on Historical 
Writing, edited by Peter Burke (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001): 97–119; and 
the excellent microhistory bibliography at Microhistory Network, https://www.microhistory.eu/index.php 
/2017/02/06/bibliography/, accessed March 2, 2020. 
16 Just before his death in 2013, journalist Cramer culled the Bush portions of What It Takes for publication 
as Being Poppy: A Portrait of George Herbert Walker Bush, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013). 
Cramer sums up Bush’s experience at the United Nations in two sentences on page 129: “But in New 
York, he found he wasn't in the game at all. Nixon and Kissinger were the whole team.” While full of a 
journalistic pith Parmet’s assessment cannot quite be described as microhistory, and this paper suggests 
there’s more to the story. 
17 Herbert S. Parmet, George Bush: The Life of a Lone Star Yankee (New York: Scribner, 1997). 
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from “cleaning up Reagan’s mess,” thus achieving an “unexpected greatness.”18 Bush 
speech-writer Curt Smith’s George H.W. Bush: Character at the Core similarly presents 
Bush the true-believer: in the institution of the presidency, in an unassuming purity of 
Middle America, and in a long-standing American exceptionalism.19 
Presidential historian Jon Meacham published an official Bush biography in 2015, 
researched and written with full approval of the Bush family. Its title places it in the 
school of heroic biography: Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George 
Herbert Walker Bush. Like Homer’s epic Odyssey which recounts a hero’s fated journey 
home to Ithaca following the Trojan War, Meacham suggests Bush rides the same mythic 
inevitability toward the White House. Meacham puts forth the conventional, 
uncomplicated portrayal of Bush’s time at the U.N. during which he offered a reasonable 
compromise to a “hostile Third World majority” that was “more than happy to try to 
embarrass the United States.”20 
When academic historians have looked at George H.W. Bush they have primarily 
focused on his four presidential years, 1989 to 1993, during which he concerned himself 
with several major historical events: the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Cold War’s 
denouement, the First Gulf War and its troubling shadows, and (most relevantly for this 
 
18 Timothy Naftali, George H. W. Bush: The American Presidents Series: The 41st President, 1989–1993, 
series edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Sean Wilentz, (New York: Times Books, 2007). Per the 
publisher’s website, this series maintains each president’s position in “the grand panorama of our chief 
executives.” See “Macmillan: Series: The American Presidents,” US Macmillan, accessed March 16, 2020, 
https://us.macmillan.com/series/. 
19 Curt Smith, George H. W. Bush: Character at the Core (Potomac Books, Inc., 2014). Like many, Smith 
highlights Richard Nixon’s assertion that Bush would “do anything for the cause” and thus deserved to 
survive through Nixon’s second-term personnel changes. The question here is to which cause is Nixon 
referring? Would Bush do anything for President Nixon, the Republican party, Middle America? The 
United States? 
20 Jon Meacham, Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush, (New York: 
Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2015), 159. 
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paper) the Chinese Communist Party’s massacre of civilians ’89 Democracy Movement 
protestors in Tiananmen Square.21 Here, Director of the Center for Presidential History at 
Southern Methodist University Jeffrey A. Engel has done more to shape the Bush legacy 
than anyone save the 41st president himself. Indeed the source notes appended to the end 
of his 2017 account of the Bush administration’s international diplomacy When the 
World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War serve as a 
remarkably comprehensive database for work on the presidency of George H.W. Bush.22 
But a tendency toward the professionalization of presidential historiography threatens to 
 
21 An excellent overview of the initial wave of literature on the First Gulf War can be found in L. Carl 
Brown’s review article “Shield and Storm in the Desert,” The International History Review 16, no. 1 
(1994): 92–113. Brown tackles no less than thirty books whose authorship spans the international 
community. How the Bush organization marched to war can be understood through John Edward Wilz’s 
“The Making of Mr. Bush’s War: A Failure to Learn from History?,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 25, 
no. 3 (1995): 533–54. Find the ecological impact of the war in the Persian Gulf in Thomas M. Hawley, 
Against the Fires of Hell: The Environmental Disaster of the Gulf War, (New York: Harcourt, 1992). For 
the shadows of the First Gulf War as captured in image, see “Blood in the Sand. The unpublished 
photographs that reveal the true horror of the Gulf War,” edited by Don McCullin, G2 The Guardian, 
February 14, 2003; “The Unseen Gulf War by Peter Turnley - The Digital Journalist,” accessed March 11, 
2020, http://digitaljournalist.org/issue0212/pt_intro.html. The massacre at Tiananmen Square has been 
treated in memoir, cultural analyses, and the politics of protest. The events of 1989 in China thread 
through Jeffrey Engel’s When the World Seemed New and the forthcoming Post Wall, Post Square: How 
Bush, Gorbachev, Kohl, and Deng Shaped the World after 1989 by Kristina Spohr, but more 
comprehensive is Zhiang Lang’s The Tiananmen Papers, edited by Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, 
(New York: PublicAffairs, 2002). The relative recency of the 1989 event makes book-length efforts by 
journalists to cover the event valuable, for example the chapter “Bush: . . . and Tiananmen” in Patrick 
Tyler’s A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China: An Investigation, (New York: Public Affairs, 1999) 
covers Bush, Scowcroft, and the Bush Administration’s China diplomacy and interactions with student 
leaders of the ’89 Democracy Movement; for more in depth analysis of the Bush Administration’s 
approach to China see former Beijing Bureau Chief for the Los Angeles Times James Mann’s About Face: 
A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton, (New York: Knopf, 
1998). A professional’s look at foreign policy changes which flowed from the Tiananmen Square massacre 
can be had in former National Intelligence Officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council 
Robert L. Suettinger’s, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989–2000, 1st edition 
(Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 
22 Jeffrey A. Engel, When the World Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War 
(Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017. Engel mistakenly places Henry Kissinger rather 
than Secretary of State William Rogers at the head of the State Department during Bush’s time at the 
USUN. Kissinger indeed “yearned to control every aspect of foreign policy,” but had not yet consolidated 
his power. This conflict between the Secretary of State and NSA Kissinger is crucial to the experience of 
George Bush at the U.N. and points out the importance of a tight focus on the individual operators within 
a state’s bureaucracy. 
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implicate practitioners in their subject’s legacy. 
Jeffrey Engel taught at the Bush School of Government & Public Service at Texas 
A&M from 2007-2012. While there he befriended the former president who subsequently 
helped Engel with class instruction. During his five years at the Bush School, Engel 
interviewed the ex-president “sometimes many times a month” followed by lunches 
together.23 He accompanied Bush on a trip to China in 2006.24 He annotated and 
prepared for publication in 2008 Bush’s personal diary from his time at the U.S. Liaison 
Office in Beijing.25 Numerous scholarly articles, book chapters, and media appearances 
followed.26 
In 2013, Engel looked to the powerful assemblage of hosting university (Texas 
 
23 “Q&A with Jeffrey Engel”, August 29, 2018, C-SPAN, https://https://www.c span.org/video/transcript 
/?id=57359, accessed March 4, 2020. 
24 Ben Westcott and Steve George CNN, “How George H.W. Bush Became Beijing’s ‘old Friend’ in the 
White House,” CNN, accessed March 19, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/01/asia/george-h-w-bush-
china-intl/index.html. 
25 George Bush, The China Diary of George H. W. Bush: The Making of a Global President, ed. Jeffrey A. 
Engel (Princeton University Press, 2008). 
26 “When the World is Going Your Way…Let It. The Hippocratic Foreign Policy of George H.W. Bush,” in 
The Dangerous First Year: National Security at the Start of a New Presidency, eds. Melvyn Leffler and 
William Hitchcock, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2018); Jeffrey A. Engel, When the World 
Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War, 1 edition (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt, 2017); “Beijing and Malta, 1989,” with Sergey Radchenko, in David Reynolds and Kristina 
Spoehr, eds. Transcending the Cold War: Summits, Statecraft, and the Dissolution of Bipolarity in 
Europe, 1970–1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 180–203; “When George Bush Believed 
the Cold War Ended, and Why that Matters,” in Michael Nelson and Barbara Perry, eds, 41: Inside the 
George H.W. Bush Presidency (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 100– 121; “Bush, Germany, and 
the Power of Time: How History Makes History,” Diplomatic History 37, no. 4, September 2013, 639–
663; “The Gulf War at the End of the Cold War and Beyond,” in Into the Desert: Reflections on the Gulf 
War, ed. Engel. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1–56; “A Better World . . . but Don’t Get 
Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush Twenty Years On,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 
1 (January 2010): 25–46; The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009); George Bush, The China Diary of George H. W. Bush: The Making of a 
Global President, ed. Jeffrey A. Engel (Princeton University Press, 2008); “George H.W. Bush: Strategy 
and the Stream of History,” in Elizabeth Borgwardt, Christopher Nichols, and Andrew Preston, eds., 
Rethinking Grand Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming); see also numerous mass 
media articles both authored and appeared in. 
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A&M), research center (The Bush School of Government and Public Service), and 
presidential library (The George H.W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum) when he 
opened and then directed the Center for Presidential History (CPH) at Southern 
Methodist University (SMU) in nearby Dallas, Texas. That same year the George W. Bush 
Presidential Center opened on the campus of SMU and thus completed the three-part 
machine for collaborative production of the younger Bush’s presidential legacy. The SMU, 
the CPH, and the George W. Bush Presidential Center have worked in a close “world-
changing partnership” since.27 These sites of production for presidential legacy leave little 
obvious room for reflexive critique. 
 This paper mines the same archives housed at the George Bush Presidential Library 
as Engel and other Bush biographers, though it finds its own vein to drift along where the 
evidence travels across cultural strata. The major source I cite is the diary kept by George 
Bush during his time at the USUN which remains largely unpublished.28 Bush’s mediation 
of his legacy begins in their composition. Note that this portion of the Bush archive, the 
years prior to his time in the White House, is not subject to the Presidential Records Act 
of 1978.29 Consequently I consider the moment of self-selection to be an equally 
 
27 “Center for Presidential History at SMU”, The George W. Bush Presidential Center and SMU, accessed 
March 10, 2020, https://www.smu.edu/BushCenter/CenterForPresidentialHistory. 
28 I turned to literary techniques for help approaching the life-narrative of George H.W. Bush such as Sven 
Birkerts, The Art of Time in Memoir: Then, Again,  (Saint Paul, MN: Graywolf Press, 2007); Sidonie 
Smith and Julia Watson, Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting Life Narratives (Minneapolis: 
University Of Minnesota Press, 2010); and Vivian Gornick, The Situation and the Story: The Art of 
Personal Narrative, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001). 
29 The Presidential Records Act 1978 shifted ownership of the executive’s records from private to public, so 
papers from these years have been sorted and saved according to federal regulations. It’s important to 
note, however, that the burden of preservation or disposal rests with the incumbent president’s office 
under the advisement of the current Archivist of the United States. This tangle of bias ought not be 
discounted when considering a presidential archive’s patterns of conspicuous inclusion and exclusion. For 
specifics on the PRA see “Presidential Records Act (PRA) of 1978,” National Archives, August 15, 2016, 
https://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/laws/1978-act.html. 
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determinant event en route to the documents’ domiciliation or “house arrest” in 1997 at 
the George Bush Presidential Library. It is there and it is then that the Bush archive “takes 
place.”30 
George H.W. Bush was appointed the United States ambassador to the United 
Nations on February 16, 1971. The first nine months of his tenure were consumed by the 
long-simmering issue of Chinese representation at the U.N. (CHIREP). By November the 
CHIREP question would be settled at last, the delegation from the communist People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) seated, the U.S.-allied Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan 
protesting in withdrawal. Meanwhile the U.S. worked covertly to structure a shocking 
visit for the cold-warrior President Richard Nixon to communist China. 
The broad view of diplomatic overtures toward China from the U.S. in the last 
third of the twentieth century suggests that President Richard Nixon’s carefully-
constructed visit in February 1972 shifted American foreign policy in absolute terms. And 
to be sure, Nixon’s China visit immediately tipped the Cold War balance: rapprochement 
with China adjusted the Soviet Union’s posture toward the United states. A summit in 
Moscow with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and progress toward nuclear arms 
limitations soon followed.31 But the Shanghai Communique issued jointly by the U.S. and 
PRC, signaling the end of Nixon’s visit, described a persistent disjunction between the 
 
30 Jacques Derrida, “Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression,” translated by Eric Prenowitz, Diacritics 25, no. 
2 (1995): 10. For more warnings vis a vis the slippage of archives see Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing 
the Past: Power and the Production of History, (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1995); Howard Zinn, 
“Secrecy, Archives, and the Public Interest,” The Midwestern Archivist 2, no. 2 (1977): 14–26; “The 
Archive(s) Is a Foreign Country: Historians, Archivists, and the Changing Archival Landscape,” The 
American Archivist 74, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2011): 600–632. 
31 For a concise recounting of the U.S.-China relationship from Pearl Harbor through the dissolution of the 




Scholars have generally approached this subject with the toolkit of the political 
scientist and worry the processes, policies, and conventional aspects of great power 
diplomacy. These analyses dwell on officials at the top of the machinery of state and tend 
to revolve around the Nixon-Kissinger axis or the story of Sino-American rapprochement 
through the lens of Kissinger’s relationship with the respected Premier of the People’s 
Republic Zhou Enlai. Exemplary of this approach is Evelyn Goh’s Constructing the U.S. 
Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”. 33 While 
thorough, Goh’s book exhibits the strengths and weaknesses of a political scientist’s 
toolkit applied to historical synthesis. Goh tells the reader in detail how perceptions of 
China changed for the major actors involved in the 1960s Sino-American rapprochement 
but does not show us what such perceptions might mean. Similarly, Rosemary Foot and 
Li Jie each treat domestic aspects of the U.S.-China relationship in the 1960s in the 
excellent anthology Re-Examining the Cold War but without meditation on the crucial 
element of mentalities. Notably absent from these kinds of texts on China-discourse is the 
 
32 The Shanghai Communiqué was a diplomatic instrument which “put a bow” on Nixon’s visit to China 
and summarized the public content of the two government’s dialogue. Similar communiqués followed 
President Jimmy Carter’s visit to China in 1979 as well as Vice President George H.W. Bush’s trip for the 
Reagan administration in 1982. In this summary statement, China recommitted itself to world revolution, 
affirmed the right of the oppressed to sovereignty, and demanded withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan. 
The U.S. committed itself to a push away from hegemony in the Pacific in principle, and to establish a 
liaison office in Beijing in practice. The Shanghai Communique, and Nixon’s visit, stopped short of 
enacting concrete normalized relations. 
33 Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally” 
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Using material from the Kennedy, Johnson, and 
Nixon presidential libraries, Evelyn Goh chronicled in detail the shifts in China-discourse with regards to 
the Nixon Administration from a constructivist’s perspective of international relations theory. For a more 
general overview of constructivism see Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International 
Relations Theory,” International Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200.  
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historicizing power of Orientalist critique.34 
Historian David Alvarez reached across such disciplinary divides somewhat when 
he turned to Graham Allison’s analyses of decision-making for his look at the Turkey 
Straits Crisis of 1946–47.35 Like Alvarez, I believe that such scientific approaches 
“obscure the fact that governments are “black boxes”” composed of individual machines. 
But I do think it’s useful to keep in mind the stakes which an individual might carry to the 
diplomatic stage. For tiny frictions and little easements play along the webs of “personal 
and organizational biases, fears, and goals” in diplomatic bureaucracies, and historians 
must attend to such human-powered contingencies.36 I try to focus this paper on the 
“variety of human and organizational actors” too often occulted by a monolithic state 
they themselves instantiate.37 
But also worthy of inclusion in any discussion of U.S.-China diplomacy, some 
harmonies stirred in the Sino-American cultural topography in the months prior to the 
CHIREP vote. “Ping-Pong Diplomacy” is the most obvious example of such chance 
 
34 Douglas Little does inform his look at U.S. officials’ relationship with and U.S. policy toward the Middle 
East with discourse on Orientalism in his fantastic American Orientalism: The United States and the 
Middle East since 1945, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002). Little invigorates 
the U.S.-Middle East conversation with important context from American popular culture. As attitudes 
toward foreign relations are shaped by the interior life of states, one must look at the mentalities of the 
individuals which construct and direct such international relationships. Chapter one “Orientalism, 
American Style: The Middle East in the Mind of America” lays out the construction of America’s 
deformed perception of the Middle East.  Chapter eight “Opportunities Lost and Found: The United Sates 
and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process” then breathes such stereotypes into his diplomatic history. see Edward 
W. Said, Orientalism, 1st edition (London: Pantheon Books, 1978); and John M. MacKenzie, 
Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts, 1 edition (Manchester ; New York : New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1995).  
35 David J. Alvarez, Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey 1943–1946 
(Institute for Balkan Studies, 1980); Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Longman, 1999). 
36 Ibid., 14. 
37 Ibid., 14. 
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diplomacy. An unplanned meeting between a U.S. table tennis player and the Chinese 
team on a bus at the World Table Tennis Championship at Nagoya, Japan in early 1971 
provided an opportunity for the PRC to invite the entire U.S. team for an impromptu visit 
to Guangzhou, Beijing, and Shanghai. The Championship produced a field for safe cross-
cultural interaction, the result of which was an unpredicted and (in hindsight) important 
turn on the path to rapprochement. Mass media attention surrounded this famed “Ping-
Pong Diplomacy,” and historians have cited the event as one of the major pieces of the 
era’s warmed relations.38 
Scholars in the Network for New Diplomatic History have used both the toolkit of 
political science and the methods of cultural theory in the production of historical sense.39 
These historians have situated individual diplomats within state structures, cultural 
narratives, and social networks. This integrative approach promises “more expansive 
 
38 “Ping-Pong Diplomacy” between U.S. and China in 1971 is sometimes used as a metric against which 
other cultural exchanges are judged, particularly in sport. See Sam Noumoff, “US and North Korea: 
Basketball Is Not Ping-Pong,” Economic and Political Weekly 48, no. 15 (2013): 12–14; R. Gerald 
Hughes and Rachel J. Owen, “‘The Continuation of Politics by Other Means’: Britain, the Two Germanys 
and the Olympic Games, 1949–1972,” Contemporary European History 18, no. 4 (2009): 443–74; Basil 
A. Ince, “Nationalism and Cold War Politics at the Pan American Games: Cuba, the United States and 
Puerto Rico,” Caribbean Studies 27, no. 1/2 (1994): 65–84; Historians Zhaohui Hong and Sun Yi frame 
“Ping Pong Diplomacy” as eminently contingent in “The Butterfly Effect and the Making of ‘Ping-Pong 
Diplomacy,’” Journal of Contemporary China 9, no. 25 (November 2000): 429–48. In an attempt to grab 
a wider audience for the World Table Tennis Championship, the president of the Japanese Table Tennis 
Association actively pushed China to attend the competition. He assured Chinese officials that Japan 
would adhere to the diplomatic norms of the Sino-Japanese relationship which did not recognize the 
“Two China’s” of the People’s Republic and the Republic of China and offered to fight for the expulsion 
of Taiwan from the Asian Table Tennis Association in a kind of assonance with the struggle over Chinese 
representation that George H.W. Bush would experience at the United Nations that same year. In 2014, 
Mayumi Itoh made a book-length argument for the importance of Gotō Kōji the president of the JTTA in 
The Origin of Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Forgotten Architect of Sino-U.S. Rapprochement (Palgrave 
Macmillan US, 2011). 
39 Information on the “New Diplomatic History” can be found at http://www.newdiplomatichistory.com. 
From 2011, a network of scholars two-hundred strong has investigated “diplomacy as an extension of 
social interests, forces, and environments,” holding conferences in 2013, 2016, and 2018. Since 2019, its 
journal Diplomatica: A Journal of Diplomacy and Society has covered “the study of diplomatic processes 
more than the study of diplomatic product.” 
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thought” about a modern diplomacy whose elements are more “normatively defined than 
outcome oriented.”40 Crucial for the study of modern diplomacy is an attendance to the 
ways which groups and individuals “perform diplomatic roles” on television and in 
media, in social settings, and in their diaries.41 Their job performance faces judgement by 
their supervisors and, for Bush, by faceless future historians. Indeed Bush’s CHIREP 
legacy is as much about his personal experiences at the USUN as ambiguous foreign-
policy wins on a presidential résumé. 
With regards to the United States and the CHIREP debate, the second chapter of 
British historian Rosemary Foot’s 2005 book The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with 
China since 1949 remains the best entry point, though Bush appears only briefly and just 
in time to lose the fight.42  That same year, the American specialist on U.S.-China relations 
 
40 Naoko Shimazu’s “Diplomacy As Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955,” Modern Asian 
Studies 48, no. 1 (2014): 231. 
41 “About”, New Diplomatic History, http://www.newdiplomaticistor.com/about/, accessed March 2, 2020. 
42 Rosemary Foot, “US Hegemony and International Legitimacy: The Chinese Representation Issue at the 
United Nations” in The Practice of Power : US Relations with China Since 1949 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). Foot’s diplomatic history puts forth that Mao and the PRC desired to participate 
in the U.N. from 1949, despite that institution’s involvement in the Korean War, the isolating effect of the 
Sino-Soviet Split, and its own internal Cultural Revolution. “A more general diplomatic offensive” from 
the PRC began in 1969, with “some 290 delegations from 80 countries” invited to visit mainland China 
in 1971. As well as this inward embrace, economic aid flowed from China out, including much to newly 
independent states in Africa with some asserted this economic aid “made the difference in the vote.” Here 
Rosemary Foot cites John Franklin Copper’s China’s Foreign Aid (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 
1976). But from the Marshall Plan, the O.D.A. following the Korean War, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 and USAID, and President Kennedy’s subsequent petition for a “Decade of Development” at the 
United Nations, economic assistance was a global matter of course throughout the decolonizing world. As 
such I disagree that Chinese aid made much practical difference in the CHIREP vote, though the effects of 
a complex “soft power struggle” thrummed through the African continent. A RAND Corporation report 
on the history of economic overtures from China also questions the effectiveness of such soft diplomacy in 
an era when the United States and the Soviet Union both offered so much more, particularly militarily. See 
chapter 2 “China in the Zone: The Cold War and After” in Andrew Scobell et al., “At the Dawn of Belt 
and Road: China in the Developing World,” Product Page (RAND Corporation, 2018), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2273.html. This history of investment in Africa remains 
important in light of China’s official Belt and Road Initiatives and attendant flood of smaller 
entrepreneurial endeavors. See Emily Feng and David Pilling, “The Other Side of Chinese Investment in 
Africa,” March 27, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/9f5736d8-14e1-11e9-a581-4ff78404524e; 
Thokozani Simelane and Lavhelesani Managa, eds., Belt and Road Initiative: Alternative Development 
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Robert S. Ross issued Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–
1989, focusing on the climax of the CHIREP issue and a longer tail of Sino-American 
rapprochement in which both states worked to strengthen diplomacy despite external 
pollutants.43 This ever-present “negotiating cooperation” required a kind of cognitive 
dissonance on the part of U.S. foreign policy operators, an inherence of amnesia when 
facing external pollutants in order to further diplomatic aims.44 
Like American and European scholars, historians in China have worked to both 
synthesize a more complex Cold War story and reevaluate settled wisdom.45  In 2003, 
 
Path for Africa (Pretoria: Africa Inst of South Africa, 2018); Md. Nazrul Islam, ed., Silk Road to Belt 
Road: Reinventing the Past and Shaping the Future (New York: Springer, 2018). Also see Patrick Tyler, A 
Great Wall: Six Presidents and China (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 45–180; Victor Kaufman 
addresses the important U.S.-British relationship during U.S-China rapprochement in “‘Chirep’: The 
Anglo-American Dispute over Chinese Representation in the United Nations, 1950–71,” The English 
Historical Review 115, no. 461 (2000): 354–77. 
43 Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1995). Ross cites domestic issues such as the Watergate hearings, factional 
conflicts in China, the prosecution of war in Southeast Asia, changes in U.S.-Soviet and Sino-Soviet 
relationships, the sale of U.S. armaments to Taiwan in the 1980s, et cetera. Throughout the decades 
following the CHIREP vote, China’s star rose in priority and fell in favor as presidential administrations 
changed.  
44 For example, historian Li Danhui described the war in Vietnam as entering into a “phase of talking while 
fighting” following Nixon’s election in 1969 in “Vietnam and Chinese Policy Toward the United States,” 
in Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: an International History, ed. William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, 
and Gong Li (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), 176. Note that my paper sets 
aside the “fighting” to focus on the “talking” part of the U.S.-China equation. Though Vietnam echoed 
through the halls of the U.N. during his time there, the grind of diplomacy pushed on for bureaucrats like 
George H.W. Bush. 
45 With regards to Cold War studies in the People’s Republic of China see Yafeng Xia’s survey “The Study 
of Cold War International History in China: A Review of the Last Twenty Years,” Journal of Cold War 
Studies 10, no. 1 (February 12, 2008): 81–115. According to Xia, Chinese historical research began in the 
mid-1970s with a simple multi-volume survey initiative. Chinese scholars educated in the United States 
published articles in the 1980s, and cooperative conferences followed. Comparable to the American 
Historical Review, China’s Lishi yanjiu (Historical Studies) regularly published articles through the 1990s 
on Cold War events, governmental policies, and methodological concerns for future study. Traveling the 
other direction, Chinese translations of Nixon and Kissinger memoirs were published in the years 
following the 1970s Sino-American rapprochement. Periodized biographies of diplomats and senior party 
officials have been published but were unavailable for this paper. Also see Zhang Baijia, “The Changing 
International Scene and Chinese Policy toward the United States, 1954–1970,” in Re-examining the Cold 
War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973, edited by Robert S. Ross and Changbin Jiang, (Cambridge, 
MA; London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), 46–76. 
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Chen Jian pushed back against predominantly geopolitical interpretations which 
characterized histories of the U.S.-China relationship, putting forth that a “profound 
connection existed between (the) two phenomena” of geopolitics and the internal ferment 
of Mao Zedong’s notion of “continuous revolution.”46 From 2000, a more free dialogue 
between Chinese and American scholars as well as a stuttered declassification of Chinese 
Communist Party archives has periodically shifted the conversation vis-à-vis previously 
obscured factors that drove front-facing diplomatic actions of the U.S. and China.47 
Notable anthologies of such syntheses arrived in 2001 and 2005.48 Though the American 
Ross’s name appears on each as co-editor, the scholarship is pointedly international and 
as such the work retains a modern credibility. 
 More recently, historians have underscored the importance of political-economic 
concerns in the rank-and-file officials of the People’s Republic of China. Li Jie points to a 
reality which runs parallel to Cold War geopolitics, a shift “away from leftist 
emotionalism and toward pragmatism.”49 Historian Charles Kraus published in 2019 a 
paper which suggests that bottom-up economic processes ultimately warmed relations 
 
46 Chen Jian, ‘The Path Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969–1972,” Bulletin of the German 
Historical Institute, Supplement 1 (2003): 26–52. This article is presented in a more broad China context 
as Chapter 9 in Chen Jian’s monograph Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001). 
47 Ibid., 91. Documents from the years which concern the CHIREP issue were declassified in 2007 but were 
unavailable for this paper. 
48 Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: an International History, ed. William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, 
and Gong Li (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005); Re-Examining the Cold War: 
U.S.–China Diplomacy, 1954–1973, ed. Robert S. Ross and Changbin Jiang (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Asia Center, 2001). 
49 Li Jie, “China’s Domestic Policies and the Normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, 1969–1979,” in 
Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History”, ed. William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, 
and Gong Li (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005), 63. 
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between China and the United States through the second half of the 1970s. 50 Mid-level 
bureaucrats in China connected with U.S. business elites in an effort to sidestep the 
gridlock of their respective governments’ foreign policy apparatuses. George H.W. Bush 
assumed both the political and economic aspects of just such informal associations when 
he began work at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. 
The fact of the future Bush presidency demands critical consideration of the ways 
in which institutions and individuals present his pre-presidential past. Scholarly 
application of monolithic terms such as “United States,” “China,” and in many cases 
personalities like “Nixon” and “Mao,” needs close query, too. These finer grains affect 
the work of careful historians, and I suggest that in the case of diplomacy in the age of 
mass and social media the animating force of historical evidence dwells in performativity, 
oblique outcomes, and the image. So mindful of epistemological limitations on language 
and archival bias, let us consider the relationship between George H.W. Bush, China, and 
the CHIREP terrain at the USUN in 1971. 
  
 
50 Charles Kraus, “More than Just a Soft Drink: Coca-Cola and China’s Early Reform and Opening,” 
Diplomatic History 43, no. 1 (2019): 107–129. Kraus pairs research at the Coca-Cola Company in 
Atlanta, Georgia with Chinese-language archives in Shanghai. This exciting new perspective on one U.S. 
business’s successful attempt to engage in commercial activity in the People’s Republic offers a 
counternarrative to the fruitless experiences of George H.W. Bush in 1970s Beijing. 
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George Bush at the United Nations 
 
 George H.W. Bush was born to win, the product of a union between the successful 
businessman-turned-senator Prescott Bush and Dorothy Walker, a daughter of an elite 
clan of bankers. George graduated from a prestigious boarding school and Yale 
University, earned the Distinguished Flying Cross for exploits in World War II’s Pacific 
Theater, and wed his teenage sweetheart, Barbara. Later, Bush made himself a major 
player in the post-war oil boom of the 1950s. But the veteran found himself a loser in his 
1970 campaign to represent Texas in the U.S. Senate. 
Still, Bush’s senate run raised his stature nationally, and by December his political 
future began to pull into focus.51 Richard Nixon and his chief-of-staff Bob Haldeman 
initially offered Bush a position as an assistant to the president. This political 
appointment would have placed him in the White House without a strictly defined role, a 
job with the sort of flexibility valued by the Nixon administration. But Bush had his eye 
on the United Nations, and sitting across from the president in December of 1970, he 
pounced.52 
At the end of their forty minute introductory meeting, Bush suggested that Nixon 
needed a sympathetic voice on the ground in Manhattan. In that media-rich metropolis, 
someone savvy like Bush could present Nixon’s programs “with some style.”53 Nixon 
 
51 Jon Meacham, Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush (New York: 
Random House, 2015), 149-150. 
52 Ibid., 151. The idea to pitch himself for the USUN position was not his own. The D.C. insider and 
journalist Charles Bartlett suggested the practical, political, and personal benefits of the job. 
53 Ibid., 153. 
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thought the idea sound, that indeed “nobody in the nation’s largest city seemed to be on 
the president’s side.”54 As well, Bush would be in Cabinet meetings “getting briefed and 
having an input on domestic policy.”55 But the job’s appeal wasn’t all domestic political 
football. In his diary, Bush suggested as yet undeveloped potential for the U.N. A month 
after his swearing-in, he declared his intention to “revitalize the U.S. presence at the U.N 
(USUN)” and in turn “represent the good things about the U.N. in the U.S.”56 
The job occupied an unusual position, both a part of and apart from the State 
Department hierarchy. Officially Bush worked for the Secretary of State William Rogers, 
though his small, self-contained staff at the USUN operated outside the massive bulk of 
state bureaucracy. Moreover, as a presidential appointee responsible for voicing foreign 
policy initiatives, he was tethered directly to the White House. This pre-existing structural 
“short-circuit” between the State Department and the Nixon Administration had grown 
more acute with the appointment of Henry Kissinger to the National Security Advisor 
(NSA) position. The short-circuit would generate mixed-messages, friction, and 
frustration for George Bush. 
For his part, President Nixon considered the U.N. little better than “a damn 
debating society” which produced little consequential results.57 Its various committees 
 
54 Meacham, Destiny and Power (2015), 153. His predecessor Charles Yost tended to isolate himself from 
the media while head of the USUN. Bush saw Yost, now out of the State Department bureaucracy and 
soured on Nixon, promoting the “liberal Democrat line” to the media. Bush U.N. Diary, 10 March 1971, 
folder 11, OA/ID 25863, United Nations Files, George Bush Collection, George Bush Presidential Library. 
55 George H. W. Bush, All the Best: My Life in Letters and Other Writings, Revised edition (New York: 
Scribner, 2013), 132 
56 Bush U.N. Diary, 10 March 1971, folder 11, OA/ID 25863, United Nations Files, George Bush 
Collection, George Bush Presidential Library. Not everyone was convinced. The capital’s Washington Star 
considered it “the appointment of a political loser,” and Bush an unqualified “conservative Republican 
Texas Oil millionaire,” see Engel, When the World Seemed New (2017), 37. 
57 “Conversation Between President Nixon and the Ambassador to the Republic of China (McConaughy), 
Washington, June 30, 1971, 12:18–12:35 p.m.,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, 
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generated piles of paper. The issues tackled were esoteric, dry, and difficult to sell to an 
American public who viewed the U.N. as an international boondoggle. “Nobody knows 
about (the U.N.),” Bush fretted in his diary.58 “And if they did know about it, they 
wouldn’t care about it.”59  
Bush needed to nurture direct communication with the Nixon-Kissinger nucleus to 
keep the wheels of diplomacy at the USUN greased. To the professional bureaucrats at the 
State Department, the White House and political appointees like Bush represented fools to 
suffer. Such antipathy flowed the other direction as well, and to the Nixon administration 
the State Department appeared obstinate, unwilling to compromise. The growing power 
of Nixon’s right-hand, NSA Henry Kissinger, complicated the situation. Bush was left to 
“walk the tightrope.”60 
This split between the National Security Council and the State Department was as 
much structural as ideological. NSA Henry Kissinger and Secretary of State William 
Rogers were driven by different goals to be sure, but their modes of action toward those 
goals were shaped by each organization’s bureaucratic make-up. Henry Kissinger 
maintained a direct control over a small, nimble staff which worked closely with the 
 
Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, eds. Steven E. Phillips and Edward C. Keefer (Washington D.C., 2006), 
doc. 136, accessed March 12, 2020, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969 
-76v17/d136. “I would just say the hell with the UN. What is it anyway? It’s a damn debating society 
What good does it do? Very little . . . They talk about hijacking, drugs, the challenges of modern society, 
and the rest just give hell to the United States. That’s all they do.” 
58 Bush U.N. Diary, 16 January 1971, folder 8, OA/ID 25863, United Nations Files, George Bush 
Collection, George Bush Presidential Library.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Bush U.N. Diary, 1 February 1971, folder 8, OA/ID 25863, United Nations Files, George Bush 
Collection, George Bush Presidential Library. Interestingly, Bush states he consulted Dean Acheson’s then-
recent 1969 memoir Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department for insight into such 
interdepartmental concerns during the Truman-Roosevelt transition. The White House-State Department 
bureaucratic roadblock was nothing new. 
 22 
President. Secretary Rogers, the opposite. Though Kissinger quickly expanded his staff 
from twelve to thirty-four during Nixon’s first term, the State Department still dwarfed 
the tiny NSC. Secretary Rogers’s massive bureaucracy boasted a staff of thousands. By 
2019, the State Department’s Foreign Service alone employed 13,000, while its Civil 
Service numbered 11,000. Another 45,000 employees made up the infrastructure which 
maintained its far-flung outposts.61 
As in mass, the two organizations differed in goals and methods. The NSC existed 
to present policy options upon which the President might directly act or choose to stand 
pat. This particular function empowered it with a direct agency, Kissinger at the helm. 
And if this Nixon-Kissinger axis leveraged a profound influence on American foreign 
policy, it was as much shaped by domestic concerns over the Nixon legacy (e.g. Sino-
American rapprochement) and re-election. 
Secretary Rogers and the State Department, however, were directed by 
bureaucratic inertia. Perhaps at the level of the individual the organization concerned 
itself with geopolitical mediation and ‘the work’ of the post-war United States project. But 
as a cumbersome machine of many moving parts, maintenance of the status quo 
predominated. Where Kissinger and his NSC pushed policy forward, the State 
Department and Rogers applied the brakes. 
With regards to China specifically, the State Department and Secretary Rogers 
took a “steady-as-you-go” course, even if the temperature of the Sino-American 
 
61 “Mission,” U.S. Department of State, accessed October 4, 2019, https://careers.state.gov/learn 
/what-we-do/mission/. 
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relationship was changing.62 For Chas Freeman Jr., an officer at the China Desk, the 
unwieldy nature of state bureaucracy was obvious. “Turning the ship of state even a few 
degrees requires an awful lot of work by the crew, and the crew generally doesn’t want to 
do it. So it’s a fairly creaky process.”63  
The former Ambassador to the United Nations under President Lyndon Johnson, 
Arthur Goldberg warned Bush about the hazards of the USUN’s peculiar position in the 
United States government. In his diary Bush makes particular note of a first-day meeting 
with Goldberg and the advice he imparted: “(1) Be sure to get the proper relationship 
with the White House. (2) Be sure that it’s made clear you’re working just for the 
president.”64 At the lunch, Goldberg seemed “generally hostile” and “on guard” to the 
State Department.65 
 Though he worked under the direct supervision of Secretary of State William 
Rogers, and President Nixon included him in meetings, Bush worked perhaps most closely 
with National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. The Cabinet courtesies offered by Nixon 
impressed Bush.66 But when he sought to reciprocate with a private dinner for Kissinger, 
the National Security Advisor let Bush know who was boss. 
 
62 Nancy Tucker, China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945-1996 (New 
York: Columbia University Press 2001), 241. 
63 Tucker, China Confidential (2001), 242. Freeman remembered “hearing Stanley Sommerfield [chief of 
Foreign Assets Control Division, Treasury Department] say to (him), “Well, that may be the president’s 
policy, but it’s not the Treasury’s.” And that was generally the attitude.” 
64 Bush U.N. Diary, 4 January 1971, folder 8, OA/ID 25863, United Nations Files, George Bush Collection, 
George Bush Presidential Library. 
65 Ibid. President Johnson personally met with Goldberg, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and the State 
Department communication center to ensure the USUN remained in the loop on all cable traffic. Though 
less clear, the diary entry implies President Johnson made a similar visit to the C.I.A. 
66 Bush All the Best (2000), 135. 
 24 
 The dinner at the Bush family residence began with his “personal touch” on 
display. After politely inviting Kissinger’s security detail inside, Bush bested the guard 
twenty-four games to four in “Tiddley Winks.”67 When the two statesmen turned at last 
to professional matters, Kissinger took the lead. He assured Bush of Nixon’s complete 
confidence.68 The two agreed on direct lines of communication between Bush’s USUN and 
the White House. Kissinger let Bush know that he’d be in on the action, that some aspects 
of diplomacy “would be better initiated from (Bush’s) office.”69 In return, Bush stated his 
intention to advocate for the President, something he felt lacking at the USUN.70 
Indeed, in the weeks of preparation for his new job Bush assayed the culture at the 
USUN and put forth a proactive attitude in his diary. “Maybe it’s the apolitical nature of 
the place,” he supposed, “but there doesn’t seem to be any great enthusiasm” for the 
president and his political positions.71 He would have to manage with a firm hand from 
the start, to push out problematic “lifers” in favor of those who could see a bigger 
picture, one which included the political effects of diplomatic maneuvers. On the advice 
of trusted advisors, Bush needed to “get control of (the USUN) in a hurry . . . (to) make 
darned sure they understand who is going to be running the place.”72 
 
67 Bush U.N. Diary, 19 January 1971, folder 8, OA/ID 25863, United Nations Files, George Bush 
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69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Bush, The China Diary (2008), 137. 
72 Bush U.N. Diary, 15 December 1970, folder 8, OA/ID 25863, United Nations Files, George Bush 
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 The potential for hurt feelings caused by circumventing Secretary of State Rogers’s 
authority did in fact concern Bush. Kissinger, he thought, “had a rather low regard” for 
the State Department chain of command. But Bush played both sides at their meeting. At 
once he voiced concerns about interdepartmental micro-betrayals and promised Kissinger 
his ready availability.73 As the relationship developed over the summer of 1971, Kissinger 
would eventually assure Bush he was “more communicative” than his superior Secretary 
Rogers, and that he was indeed “the President’s man.”74 But more significantly Bush was 
also “Kissinger’s man,” as their increasingly tight relationship placed him in the middle of 
the foreign policy action, able to “do his homework” and “learn the business cold.”75 
The contrast with this close talk came the following week, when Secretary Rogers 
invited Bush to dinner with the Prince and Princess of Spain. Here, Spanish guitar players 
serenaded the dignitaries, and they “hung in there for a long time, twanging away.”76 
Rogers waved his arms comically, worked to get the musicians to stop.77 The next night, 
Bush wrote, the two “entertained 8 or 9 of the black ambassadors.”78 
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At the U.N., too, Bush faced obligatory “stilted” official luncheons.79 These “long 
deadly lunches given by the Secretary General” dragged on for hours in the middle of the 
day while providing few opportunities for substantive engagement. Bush lamented “the 
wine, the heavy meal,” all of which of wasted time and left him no room to operate.80 
Fostering successful relationships with other nations’ representatives demanded a less 
formal approach, he thought, one which traded cocktails for bottles of beer.81 But even 
that “social whirl” wore on him.82 Some nights out were of great benefit, and the 
congenial “personal touch” gained from Bush’s experiences in society life eased 
diplomacy. Other engagements simply added to the often unproductive grind of a 
diplomat always on the company clock. “Tonight it was the Stuttgart ballet . . . it didn’t 
help the job any, and it didn’t help the President any, and it didn’t help my ulcers any.”83 
Diving into ‘vodka diplomacy’ with his Soviet counterpart at the U.N. Yakov Malik also 
did his ulcers no favors. “Vodka before, vodka during, wine during, offer of cognac after, 
long philosophical discussion,” so went Bush’s efforts at connection with the regularly 
frigid Soviet diplomat.84 
But while foreign delegations could focus solely on representing their own 
country’s interests at the U.N., Bush bore additional responsibilities. The U.N.’s 
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institutional deficiencies often became Bush’s headaches, too. “There are tremendous host 
country problems,” he reported.85 
For one, the finances of the U.N. were mismanaged, and paychecks weren’t being 
delivered to the staff that kept the organization functioning.86 Compounding these fiscal 
shortcomings, the U.N. floated an injudicious plan to expand its Manhattan facilities.87 
1970s New York represented the “fundamental core” of the U.N.’s problems for Bush.88 
He saw no wisdom in investing more money into the U.N.’s New York location when the 
city was “the most expensive place, terrible crime, impossible living conditions.”89 New 
York City, he thought, presented foreign officials at the U.N. a funhouse-mirror 
perspective which emphasized “tremendous intensified urban problems that are not ‘the 
real America.’”90 In his diary, the beleaguered Bush griped that “the Host Country 
problems are beginning to bug me.”91 
Privately, he longed for a crisis that might allow him to operate, a major military 
conflict to mediate for example, or a productive conflict with the Russians.92 The long-
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simmering debate over who would represent China at the United Nations, the communist 
People’s Republic or the tiny Republic of China, boiled over in the second half of 1971. 
Here was the pulpit George Bush desired. 
  
 29 
Section 2: The CHIREP Vote 
 
 The American-led reorganization of the global order after World War II stretched 
far beyond Europe’s Marshall Plan. These efforts mostly failed to permeate the closed 
borders of post-war China. Efforts by U.S. agents of diplomacy failed to defuse tensions 
between Chiang Kai-Shek’s American-supported, officially democratic, nationalist 
government and supporters of communist visionary Mao Zedong. October 1st, 1949 
heralded the declaration of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), with Chiang’s rump 
Republic of China (ROC) pushed across the strait to Taiwan. These competing Chinese 
governments possessed a distinctly disproportionate relationship. The PRC represented 
China’s expansive population and landmass, and therefore wielded its diplomatic power 
in practice on the global stage. The ROC, tiny in size and buttressed by the expansive 
reach of U.S. power, appeared its exact opposite. 
 Economic expansion and the new nuclear paradigm which marked the early years 
of the Cold War provided the opportunity, the means, and the need for the emergence of 
the United States as a premier global power. The Chinese government on Taiwan 
provided an important circuit for that power to flow more intensely into the Pacific. 
Affirmed as the official Chinese delegation to the U.N. in 1952, the ROC offered the U.S. 
an effective second seat at the U.N.’s powerful Security Council. More obliquely, the tiny 
democratic China offered precious leverage in America’s efforts at what it perceived as 
containment of the constant threat of communist expansion. Taiwan lent the perception 
of democratic health at Communism’s doorstep, a piece of the Western Bloc in the East. 
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 However, the ROC’s status gradually shifted from Western asset to American 
liability, predominantly due to two factors. First, a split in the Sino-Soviet relationship 
grew from around 1956, the result of an ideological divergence between the Chinese 
Communist Party and Khrushchev-era endeavors toward a “de-Stalinzation” of Soviet 
domestic and foreign policy. The split undercut the prevailing western notion of a 
monolithic Communist threat from unified Sino-Soviet actions. Additionally this break 
adjusted China’s diplomatic posture toward the United States.93 
 Even as the effects of this Sino-Soviet split’s acute phase rippled through the 1960s, 
Khrushchev still wielded the China question as a diplomatic tool for the U.S.S.R. After the 
so-called “Albanian Resolution” introduced the issue of Chinese representation (CHIREP) 
in 1961, Khrushchev described the situation in a speech before the U.N. as “anomalous 
that (mainland) China is not having her seat at the U.N.”94 Khrushchev foresaw an 
increasingly global impact of the CHIREP issue. “The peoples are waiting for it,” he 
declaimed, “it is only a matter of time.”95 
 Who are these “peoples” identified by Khrushchev? It is possible he meant the 
massive citizenry of the PRC, but Khrushchev was probably signaling the growing 
community of nations not aligned with the powers of the West nor the U.S.S.R. Indeed 
the second factor affecting the issue of CHIREP can be located in this group of non-
aligned states exploding from the collapse of the 19th century colonial empires following 
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World War II. Decolonization saw an efflorescence of new sovereign states across Africa, 
Southwest and Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe. Following Tunisia, Morocco, and 
Sudan in 1956, fifty-four more delegations claiming their voice at the U.N. by 1971.96 
 Along with the PRC, this new voting bloc represented a third power, apart from 
the spheres of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., independent in histories, goals, and methods. 
Recent scholarship suggests the PRC considered this growing block of non-aligned 
nations vital to its foreign policy as early as 1953.97 China appeared to signal its 
leadership role with this third Cold War bloc at the Asian-African conference held in 
Bandung, Indonesia in 1955.98 Twenty years later, Mao put forth his “Theory of Three 
Worlds” in 1974 just before his death.99 Thus, from nearly the beginning of the PRC in 
1949, its leadership has recognized its preeminent role in the non-aligned world. 
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 The importance of this proliferation of new states to the USUN’s diplomatic 
strategy was not lost on the U.S. State Department. In mid-September, Bush received an 
overview of U.N. member nations’ attitudes toward the CHIREP issue from staffer Harry 
Thayer. It laid out in plain fact what many knew already. The PRC had achieved a 
remarkable parity with the island of Taiwan. Each enjoyed diplomatic relations with 
around sixty states, while both boasted a nearly equal number of states which recognized 
their sovereignty.100 
 What were the stakes of membership in the United Nations for the two opposing 
China’s? For the small ROC, retention of its seat at the UN meant continued political 
legitimacy, but also the added value of membership in the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. Access to the economic aid those programs provided was vital, 
especially as its relationship with the U.S. frayed. 
 For the PRC, membership in the U.N. meant global recognition of both their 
regional hegemony as well as their unofficial leadership within the third bloc of non-
aligned states. Such legitimacy generated leverage against both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., 
crucial for the PRC’s successful foreign policy implementation. As torch-bearer for what 
they perceived as the ‘true communism,’ membership at the U.N. represented a 
tremendous step for the world revolution. 
 From the 1960s, the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania introduced annually a 
resolution which sought to settle the CHIREP issue through the expulsion of the ROC in 
favor of the communist PRC. In September 1971, the People’s Socialist Republic of 
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Albania introduced its perennial resolution which argued the ROC place at the U.N. to be 
“unlawful,” demanding ejection of ROC representatives.101 But this year, the United 
States would counter with its own resolution. 102 It would be George Bush’s task to push it 
through. 
  At a meeting of Nixon’s National Security Council (NSC) back in March 1971, 
the “dual representation” solution to the CHIREP issue was suggested by “Kissinger and 
Rogers.”103 This U.S. potential counter-strategy to the annual Albanian Resolution would 
theoretically push seats for both delegations at the U.N., with China’s Security Council 
seat occupied by the PRC. But generally the tenor of the NSC remained inflexible toward 
CHIREP. As well, Vice President Spiro Agnew, a cold warrior and dedicated anti-
communist pushed for “(going) down with the ship.”104 “Asians will respect us more, 
etc.” Secretary of the Treasury John Connally described the political benefits an obvious 
enemy provided.105 Bush agreed, the PRC represented “something to be against,” a good 
foil for U.S. democratic ideology.106 
 But at the start of August 1971, Secretary of State William Rogers issued a 
statement specifically addressing the inevitable annual vote on CHIREP. Hinting at a dual 
representation strategy, Rogers referenced recent Nixon pragmatism in Latin America. 
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“We must deal realistically with governments . . . as they are,” read the press release.107 
The Secretary’s clumsy attempt at a Kissinger-style realpolitik fell flat, though, when it 
came time for questions from the press pool.108 The next day, the ROC Foreign Ministry 
in Taipei did not hide its concern over Secretary Rogers’s statement, warning of 
“infiltration, subversion, and eventual destruction (of the U.N.)” should the PRC be 
seated.109 
 A few days later, U.N. staffer Harry Thayer’s memo suggested the doomed effort 
to save the ROC had heated up. “We will have made opening pitches,” he wrote, “ to at 
least forty (other U.N.) missions.”110 On the 17th, Bush moved to get ahead of the 
CHIREP problem and officially introduced an agenda item titled “The Representation of 
China in the United Nations.”111 The next day, a briefing paper circulated which both 
acknowledged the change in attitude toward the PRC signaled by the dual representation 
plan and prepared U.S. officials for anticipated press queries on the agenda item’s 
conspicuous lack of content.112 
 
107 Press Release, USUN-108-(71) 2 August 1971, folder 11, OA/ID 25863, United Nations Files, George 
Bush Collection, George Bush Presidential Library. 
108 “Q: Mr. Secretary, from the wording of this statement, it would appear that the United States would be 
also in favor of both Vietnams, both Koreas and both Germanies. Is that a correct assumption?” Ibid. 
Back in March, Bush and State Department staff member Phil Habib visited with General Secretary U 
Thant following the early NSC meeting on the prospect of dual representation. Habib voiced similar 
concerns then, “Some things you ought to think of, namely, this might open the door for the North 
Vietnamese to do it.” Bush U.N. Diary, 28 March 1971, folder 11, OA/ID 25863, United Nations Files, 
George Bush Collection, George Bush Presidential Library. 
109 Tad Szulc, “U. S. Backs U. N. Seat for Peking, Opposes Ousting Taiwan,” The New York Times, August 
3, 1971. https://www.nytimes.com/1971/08/03/archives/us-backs-un-seat-for-peking-opposes-ousting-
taiwan-old-policy-ended.html. 
110 Memorandum, Harry Thayer to George Bush, 5 August 1971, folder 1, OA/ID 25862, United Nations 
Files, George Bush Collection, George Bush Presidential Library. 
111 Letter, George Bush to Secretary-General of the United Nations, 17 August 1971, folder 10, OA/ID 
25861, United Nations Files, George Bush Collection, George Bush Presidential Library. 
112 “Press Briefing Paper, Subject: Chinese Representation,” 18 August 1971, folder 10, OA/ID 25861, 
United Nations Files, George Bush Collection, George Bush Presidential Library. 
 35 
 The previous summer, Nixon had surprised everyone with an announcement that 
he would visit the People’s Republic of China. Even as the CHIREP issue was coming to a 
head the U.S. and the PRC negotiated the details of this upcoming summit. Kissinger led 
these negotiations, and he intended to announce on October 5 another upcoming trip to 
Beijing.113 This trip’s timing complicated the CHIREP situation, so Bush conferred with 
the two statesmen. 
Nixon gave Bush a long leash and advised him to operate with a free hand 
tactically, to “go all out—especially on procedural matters.” 114 But Nixon also reminded 
him to think ahead and to have his main speech prepared “before (the) vote.”115 However 
the USUN’s institutional short-circuit clouded the meeting, and the disconnect between 
Bush’s two supervisors, Secretary of State Rogers and Henry Kissinger, remained a 
problem.116 At a meeting later that day between Bush and NSC assistant Al Haig, the two 
agreed that the U.S. very well might lose the CHIREP vote.117 Despite the administration’s 
forethought, meetings, and strategic planning, bullet-points from this meeting with Haig 
such as “much delay as possible” and “scratch heads on what to do” suggest U.S. officials 
at the mercy of the developing events.118 
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 On October 10th, Secretary of State Rogers joined CBS’s Face the Nation to relate 
the importance of settling the CHIREP issue to the American public. Rogers noted that 
the PRC represented a population of 700 million and should not be isolated from “trade, 
cultural exchange, scientific exchanges, (exchanges) of journalists, and so forth.”119 The 
tight “horse race” to keep the ROC represented at the U.N. “would be very close,” added 
Rogers.120 To lose it would subsequently trouble the status of “ten other nations” that 
exhibited similar intranational conflicts.121 
 Face the Nation’s George Herman wondered if, given the upcoming visits to 
Beijing by both Kissinger and Nixon, the State Department was merely “going through 
the motions” for a “creditable public defense” of the ROC.122 Did the U.S. have its “eye 
on Peking, not Taiwan?”123 The question put Rogers on his heels. States which sought the 
expulsion of the ROC ought to look at the bigger ramifications of such a decision, he 
argued.124 The entire history of the United Nations could be wholly delegitimized.125 
Rogers insisted the CHIREP vote was not as close as news reports might make it 
sound. Privately he’d received many assurances of pro-ROC votes. Smelling blood, 
Herman cut the Secretary off mid-sentence. “Which ones?” he demanded.126 “Well,” 
Rogers demurred, “I’m not going to say.”127 
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On his copy of the transcript, Bush highlighted the next exchange as significant. 
These international issues at the U.N., did they affect the willingness of Congress to 
continue financing the U.N.? If the ROC were ejected, would Congrees close its purse? 
When pressed, Rogers was forced to admit, “Yes, I think we’ll have difficulty” there.128 
Many senators had stated exactly this.129 Should Congress pull its funding assistance to 
the U.N., it was George Bush as head of the host mission who would handle the 
budgetary headaches.130 
A draft of Bush’s introduction to the official CHIREP debate scheduled for 
October 18th soon made the rounds at the State Department.131 The scribbled notes 
indicate a desire to tame the language of conflict, leaving room in the speech’s language 
for future cooperation with the inevitable PRC delegation at the United Nations. The 
PRC’s “exclusion” from the U.N. was rejected in favor of its “absence.”132 The “cold and 
forbidding attitude in Peking” was struck for the anodyne “Peking’s former posture.”133 
The expulsion of the ROC would no longer “tear this organization apart,” but would 
“damage the very fabric” of the U.N.134 The United States plan to solve CHIREP with 
dual representation, the speech now read, “carefully closes no doors.”135 
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The State Department machine prepared a statement which walked a careful line of 
mediation, setting a firm but cooperative tone for the upcoming debate. But following the 
Albanian delegation’s introduction of their CHIREP proposal, a frustrated Bush 
introduced the speech with surprising invective.136 Bush delivered the statement’s first two 
sentences as prepared, then began to voice his personal opinions. The Albanian officials 
spoke “outrageous slanders” and “old-fashioned tirade.”137 They “rolled the clock back” 
with “clichés of the Cold War,” but Bush declared he would take the high road “without 
name calling.”138 Regaining his composure, Bush continued with the speech as prepared 
by the State Department. 
The friction between George Bush’s two bosses cut his feet from beneath him at 
this crucial moment in the CHIREP debate, the introductory statement by the United 
States.139 Bush initially “felt that the speech was going to be cleared out of the White 
House,” meaning Kissinger and Nixon. But Secretary of State Rogers phoned Bush, and 
they “went over it” agreeing to “certain changes.”140 All seemed settled. Then, “five 
minutes before” he was to deliver the speech, Bush received a call with changes “the 
White House insisted on.”141 Kissinger’s assistant Al Haig made the phone-call, and 
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insisted he would “go to the President” if Bush did not comply.142 One can understand 
how Bush felt afterward that “it was not a good situation.”143 
On October 23rd, two days before the CHIREP vote, Bush spoke with Kissinger to 
again tighten up “procedures for working together.”144 Any agreement in principle 
between the two, Bush was to implement outright. Kissinger reassured Bush of the Nixon 
administration’s unfailing support. Once more, Bush was told that “you’re our man.”145  
Bush noticed a continued paranoia from Kissinger toward Secretary of State Rogers, 
jotting down in his notes that the NSA was “Gun shy about State Dept knowing 
anything.”146 Two days later, the U.S. lost the CHIREP fight. On October 25th, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations voted down the resolution for dual 
representation. The tally, fifty-nine against and fifty-five for, was as much a referendum 
on U.S. hegemony as a coronation of communist China. “The villains are documented in 
our [file],” Bush wrote, and “some anti-American delegates literally danced in the 
aisles.”147 The ROC delegation walked out to applause.148 
For some in the New York media, though, the defeat at the United Nations 
belonged to George Herbert Walker Bush. President Nixon put Bush in front of the 
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cameras of television talk-shows Firing Line, Issues and Answers, and The Dick Cavett 
Show in an effort to spin the CHIREP loss.149 Some blame caught up with Bush on 
Capitol Hill as well, with one Representative calling for his resignation.150 But many felt 
he had been “sandbagged,” and voiced support, notably Gerald Ford who was not yet 
Nixon’s Vice President.151 Bush would, however, have to visit several Congressional 
committees and do “a little hand-holding in Washington.”152 
Documents released in 2002 describe a July 1971 meeting between Kissinger and 
the PRC Prime Minister Zhou Enlai.153 Several months before the CHIREP debate heated 
up, Zhou raised the prospect of a dual representation resolution at the U.N. which the 
PRC would of course oppose “because that means two China’s.”154 Kissinger plainly 
assured the official, “this is temporarily one China, one Taiwan.”155 Zhou noted the 
contradiction between such an attitude and Nixon’s overtures toward the PRC. Kissinger 
then admitted that forcing a decision on the CHIREP issue could be a “good way to end 
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153 “Memorandum of Conversation, Chinese Government Guest House Peking, 11 July 1971 10:35a to 
11:55a” (The National Security Archive at the George Washington University), OA/ID 1031, Exchanges 
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October 2, 2019, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-38.pdf. More at “The Beijing-
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the issue.”156 Indeed, the vote at the U.N. on October 25th ended the issue for China, the 
U.S., and George Bush. 
While Bush did not initially think Kissinger intentionally threw the match, as time 
passed he adopted a more critical position on the severe handicap Kissinger’s visit placed 
on the U.S. position.157 Bush’s initial thoughts as recorded in his U.N. diary describe 
mixed feelings toward Kissinger’s secret visits to the People’s Republic of China. “There is 
no question in my mind that the Kissinger visit gave our position some incredibility,” 
Bush reflected, but also that he believed Kissinger “did not deliberately sabotage the UN 
vote.”158 Years after the 1971 CHIREP vote, in conversation with Taiwanese Ambassador 
James Shen, Bush wondered “what was Kissinger doing in Beijing?”159 Regardless, NSA 
Kissinger’s phoned Bush in “an ugly mood” and blamed him for procedural 
breakdowns.160 The call ended with Bush’s boss Kissinger stating flatly, “I am not 
amused.”161 
During its first year, the PRC at the United Nations expressed a tendency toward 
maintaining its “negotiating cooperation” posture with the United States. The two shared 
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outlooks on global events which threatened hot wars such as conflicts between India and 
Pakistan, the rapidly developing issue of international terrorism, and the U.N. supervision 
of the complex border arrangements between Lebanon and Israel.162 At the same time, the 
PRC leveraged its increasingly strong position outside the U.S.-U.S.SR. dichotomy to push 
the interests of non-aligned nations regarding concerns such as African political and 
economic independence, seabed and coastal sovereignty, and the intersection of 
environmental concerns with underdevelopment.163 
Though forced to take the fall for CHIREP, Bush labored on at the USUN for 
another year. His eventual departure from the USUN in January 1973 to chair the 
Republican National Committee (RNC) for president Nixon disappointed some.164 This 
jump back into party politics would eventually disappoint Bush himself when the 
Watergate scandal began to force the Nixon Administration’s focus away from foreign 
diplomacy.165 As Bush grabbed the wheel at the RNC, the increasingly problematic 
Watergate situation placed him on the defensive, and he was forced to spend “an 
enormous amount of time as chairman trying to reassure (Republicans) that . . . the party 
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had nothing to do with Watergate, and that our President was innocent.”166 An 
impossible task, as Nixon eventually faced impeachment, then resignation, and the 
Republican party was left to pick up the pieces. Looking back in 2013, Bush offered a 
curt assessment of his year directing the RNC. “It was not an easy job.”.167  
 





When post-Watergate caretaker Gerald Ford presented Bush with an offer to 
return to diplomatic work, Bush retreated to the other side of the globe.168 Despite the 
obvious paradox, he opted to direct the recently-established U.S. Liaison Office in 
Beijing.169 Bush flew in to Beijing’s dynamic diplomatic community, ready to treat with a 
post-CHIREP China that he presented in his diary as a unique, crucial actor for the 
emerging globalized future.170 Instead the diplomat found himself restrained by familiar 
bureaucratic frictions and constrained by acute cross-cultural myopia. 
 American industry, academia, and cultural operators hungry for China’s massive, 
largely untapped consumer base almost exclusively faced disappointment and rejection 
from the USLO in Beijing.171 Bush was “unable to put in the requested personal word” for 
a Washington Press Club junket.172 “I wish I could be more encouraging,” Bush wrote to 
a professional soccer club.173 A music festival asked for help facilitating Chinese 
participation, but he was forced to admit that “the USLO have little influence over these 
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decisions.”174 A letter to a radio station saw Bush throw up his hands entirely. “If you 
make it, be sure to let me know.”175 Diplomacy at the USLO in Beijing presented its own 
disconnect. Officials for the People’s Republic took a distinctly formal approach to 
statecraft, and their measured pace stymied Bush’s efforts to make headway. In Beijing, 
Bush was a gatekeeper without a gate.  
Two events which might have provided capstones for Bush’s year in Beijing fizzled 
where they should have flashed. First President Ford’s visit to Beijing in 1975 played out 
cordially but with little effect and conspicuously absent a summit-capping communiqué.176 
Faced with friction and far from home, that same year Bush puffed his chest full of true-
believer pomp, flew in his family, and tried to assemble a Texas-sized July 4th 
Independence Day celebration. Though George Bush’s America descended on Beijing in 
patriotic bunting, hot dogs, Coca-Cola, and cigarettes, the performance was blank with 
inconsequence. 177 At the end of his USLO tenure just a few months later, Bush noted that 
in his mind China yet considered the U.S. to be an impotent “paper tiger.”178 
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The inexperienced diplomat could not have imagined on his arrival at the USUN in 
1970 how completely China would populate the political, professional, and personal 
rhythms of his life. But from this first experience with diplomacy during the CHIREP 
fight, Bush labored to plait a special relationship with his China-imaginary. A few years 
after leaving the USLO in 1975, he visited China as a business-minded civilian on the 
invitation of then-ascendant Chinese Communist Party official Deng Xiaoping.179 High-
profile visits as Reagan’s Vice President came in 1980, 1982, and again in 1985.180 
It’s possible that Bush hoped his return to China as president in 1989 would signal 
he had moved from confounded to confident, from low-level State Department sinologist 
to seasoned “China Hand.”181 When the People’s Liberation Army violently suppressed 
protestors and civilians just months later, the typically delegatory Bush did lean on his 
long-standing personal relationships with Chinese officials. Bush managed the situation 
through a “near monopolization of China Policy.”182 But his public cessation of high-level 
communication with the Chinese Communist Party failed to signal a hard stance against 
the massacre in Tiananmen Square. Despite such posturing Bush retained covert contact 
with Chinese Communist Party officials, and he dispatched his National Security Advisor 
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Brent Scowcroft to hand-deliver a personal letter to leader Deng Xiaoping which 
bestowed America’s critical absolution on the violence.183 
George H.W. Bush’s relationship with China might be seen to have climaxed with 
this careful non-response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, but he continued to 
mold his China legacy even after leaving public office. In 2008 Bush produced his China 
Diary of George H.W. Bush: The Making of a Global President. The fascinating book’s 
publication was well-timed: that year the global gaze turned to Beijing for the Summer 
Olympics. Even after Bush’s death in November 2018 work on the Bush-China legacy 
continued as journalists and concerned parties seized the theme for a litany of obituaries. 
Indeed Bush authority Jeffrey Engel appeared to close the circuit when he assured CNN 
that “there’s no doubt Beijing sees him as the best friend China has ever had in the White 
House.”184 
The Bush family’s frequent deployment of a cherished image captured during his 
time at the USLO in Beijing suggests he kept his China-imaginary close.185 He and his wife 
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Barbara chose this image for their 1975 family Christmas card.186 Blown-up to a colossal 
banner, the image greeted visitors to the George Bush Presidential Library and 
Museum.187 There’s even evidence that Chinese Communist Party officials valued the 
image as well.188 The picture remains atop a 2009 feature on the English-language China 
Daily website which emphasized the special relationship between the Bush family and 
China.189 
This image was captured on May 30, 1975. Journalist John Burns had lately been 
“running around taking pictures, jumping out from behind trees” in the Chinese capital 
to capture George Bush and his wife Barbara in situ for a “’lifestyle’ in Peking kind of 
thing” that would soon run in People Magazine.190 He posed the couple “at the Forbidden 
City. . . for a cover shot.”191 In the photo, George and Barbara Bush stand with their 
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bicycles before Tiananmen, the Gate of Heavenly Peace. The sun lowers toward the 
horizon, and the shadows cast by residents of Beijing and People’s Liberation Army 
soldiers stretch across the ground. Chairman Mao joins the diplomat and his wife, though 
he is only a portrait which peers over their shoulders, his face a balance of benevolence 
and inscrutability. Barbara smiles, and George squints out at China and into the sun 
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